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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

INTRODUCT I ON

O

ne of the principal purposes of the United Nations is "to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace." It was with this object in view that the United Nations
Charter created the International Court of Justice as one of the
principal organs of the United Nations (Articles 1 and 7).
The importance of the place occupied by the Court in the
United Nations is emphasized by other provisions of the Charter: the
Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (Article
92); again, the Security Council, when called upon to make recommendations in a dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, should take into
consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred
by the parties to the International Court of Justice (Article 36).
The purpose of the present pamphlet is to give a short account
of the organization of the Court, its jurisdiction, the manner in which
it functions and, finally, the judgments and advisory opinions delivered
by the Court since its creation. This will be preceded by a brief historical outline of the judicial settlement of international disputes.
1

HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
1.

The O rig in of Arbitration

The idea ,o f entrusting the settlement of international disputes to an
impartial authority, which would give a decision on the basis of law,
is a very old one. Examples are to be found in ancient Greece, but th
modern development of international arbitration dates from the Jay
Treaty of 1794, between Great Britain and the United States, which
provided for the establishment of mixed eommissions for the settlement of a number of disputes existing between the two countries.
These commissions were composed of an equal number of members
appointed by each of the parties and presided over by an umpire.
During the nineteenth century, the movement in favor of arbitration
gathered momentum. A decisive stage in this development was
marked by the Alabama arbitration between the United States and
Great Britain in 1872. In the years that followed, several other international disputes were settled by arbitration.
2.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration

A further stage in the development of the judicial settlement of international disputes was reached with the First Hague Conference of
1899. The powers which took part in this conference signed the
Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
in which they undertook to use their best efforts to ensure the pacific
settlement of international differences with a view to obviating, as far
as possible, recourse to force in the relations between states. Believing that the only effective means of extending the rule of law and of
increasing respect for international justice was the creation of a
permanent arbitral body open to all states, they set up the Permanent
Court of Arbitration. Although the latter was a permanent institution,
it was not a permanent tribunal in the true sense of the word but a
panel of about 150 to 200 persons (four from each contracting power)
from among whom states could select one or more arbitrators to form
a tribunal for the settlement of a particular dispute.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was maintained by
the Second Hague Conference of 1907, is still in existence. From 1899
to the present, it has decided about 20 cases, some of which have been
of considerable importance. The functioning of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, however, presupposes that two states, although parties
to a dispute, are nevertheless animated by a sincere desire to arrive at
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a settlement. They must not only agree beforehand to submit the dispute to arbitration, but must also reach agreement with respect to the
arbitrators to be appointed and the formulation of the questions to be
submitted to them. It is obvious that the negotiations leading to such
an agreement may be both lengthy and difficult.
The Second Hague Conference had envisaged the establishment of two bodies whose permanent character was much more
marked than that of the Permanent Court of Arbitration: an international Prize Court and an Arbib'al Court of Justice. Although, for
various reasons, these two attempts did not succeed, they are nevertheless of interest since they show that it was in the field of judicial
institutions that the powers sought to make a first step in the direction
of international organization. A member of the United States delegation to the Second Hague Conference expressed himself in words
which history has borne out in a striking manner, when he declared,
in connection with the Arbitral Court of Justice, that: "A court of
that kind will deliver its judgments in virtue of the authority of the
united nations."
3.

The Permanent Court of International Justice and the
International Court of Justice

The creation in 1920 of the Permanent Court of International Justice,
for which provision had been made in the Covenant of the League of
Nations, marked the greatest advance in the field of the judicial settlement of international disputes. The Permanent Court of International Justice was a court in the real sense of the term and was ready
to function at any time. It is b'ue that, as in the case of the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, its jurisdiction depended solely upon the consent
of the parties to a dispute. On the other hand, the fact that the Court
was open to states at any time made it possible for them to accept its
jurisdiction not only for the purposes of a particular dispute but for
all disputes which might arise in the future-that is, before any dispute had come into being-and hence at a time when they were not
divided by disagreement. In other words, there existed, for the first
time, an international tribunal, having a corporate character, before
which a state could bring a dispute by means of a unilateral application calling upon another state to appear before it, without there being
any need for the parties to the dispute to reach a prior agreement on
the composition of the tribunal and the questions to be submitted to it.
The Permanent Court of International Justice sat for the first
time in 1922. Its activities were interrupted by the Second World War
and in 1946 it was dissolved in consequence of the dissolution of the
League of Nations. Between 1922 and 1939, however, it dealt with
79 cases, (of which 51 were contentious) which states had referred
to it either by special agreement or by unilateral application, while 28
4

cases arose from requests for advisory opinions submitted by the Council of the League of Nations. In some hundreds of treaties provision
was made enabling states to bring disputes before the Court by unilateral application. Numerous states also recognized the Comt's compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2, of its Statute.
In 1945, a new judicial organ, the International Court of Ju tice, was brought into being by the Charter of the United Nations.
The Statute of the Court is annexed to the Charter, of which it forms
an integral part. Except for a few changes, most of which are purely
formal, it is similar to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. Furthermore, when the new Court met, it adopted the
Rules of Court of its predecessor without any substantial change. The
work of the Permanent Court of International Justice, which began
in 1922, is today entrusted to the International Court of Justice and
therefore continues uninterrupted. This is more especially true since
the great number of treaties, conventions and undertakings which, as
stated above, provided for the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice are, for the most part, still in force; the Statute
of the present Court (Article 37) lays down that, whenever a treaty
or convention provides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to have
been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Permanent Court
of International Justice, the matter shall be referred to the International Court of Justice.
II
ORGANIZATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1.

The Judges of the Court

The Court consists of 15 judges who are elected by the General
Assembly and the Security Council. They are chosen from a list of
persons nominated by the national groups in the Permanent Court of
Arbitration; or, in the case of members of the United Nations not
represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, by national groups
appointed for this purpose by their governments under the same conditions as those prescribed for members of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration. The General Assembly and the Security Council hold
separate elections independently of one another. They must be satisfied not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess
the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, but also that, in the body as a
whole, the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems
of the world should be represented. To be elected, a candidate must
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obtain a majority of votes, both in the Assembly and in the Council.
Not more than one candidate of the same nationality may be elected.
The Statute lays down the procedure to be applied when one or more
seats still remain unfilled after three meetings have been held for the
purpose of the election but concurring majorities have not been
achieved in the two organs. There is also a provision laying down the
conditions under which a state which is a party to the Statute but is
not a member of the United Nations may take part in the election of
judges of the Court.
Judges of the Court are elected for terms of nine years and are
eligible for re-election. As a result of special transitory provisions
made with regard to the elections held in 1946, with a view to ensuring the gradual renewal of the Court, the terms of five of the 15
judges expire at the end of every three years.
Every three years the Court elects its President and VicePresident, who are eligible for re-election.
The judges are bound to hold themselves permanently at the
disposal of the Court unless they are on leave or prevented by illness
or other serious reasons recognized as valid. No judge rna y exercise
any political or administrative function or engage in any other occupation of a professional nature. Furthermore, no judge may act as agent,
counselor advocate in any suit or participate in the decision of any
case in which he has previously taken part as a representative of one
of the parties or in any other capacity.
In order to protect them against any political pressure, it is
provided that no judge can be dismissed unless, in the unanimous
opinion of the other judges, he has ceased to fulfill the required conditions.
When engaged on the business of the Court, the judges enjoy
diplomatic privileges and immunities. Before taking up their duties,
they must make a solemn declaration in open court that they will
exercise their powers impartially and conscientiously.

2.

Judges ad hoc

In the circumstances set out in section V of this pamphlet, the parties
to a case before the Court are entitled to choose ad hoc, or national,
judges. These judges are not permanent judges of the Court and sit
only in the particular case for which they have been appointed. They
take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with the other
judges of the Court.

3.

Assessors and Experts

The Court may invite assessors to sit with it for the consideration of
a particular case. Unlike the judges ad hoc, assessors are not entitled

6

to vote, and they are chosen by the Court itself and not by the parties. The Court may also entrust any individual or organization that it
may select with the task of carrying out an enquiry or giving an expert opinion.

4.

The Reg istry

The Registry of the Court consists of a registrar, a deputy-registrar
and other officials. The Registrar and Deputy-Registrar are elected by
the Court for a term of seven years and may be re-elected. The other
officials of the Registry are appointed by the Court on proposals submitted by the Registrar. The Registrar is responsible for all departments of the Registry. He prepares and keeps up to date the General
List of cases submitted to the Court. He is the regular channel for
communications to and from the Court and, within the limits of the
discretion attaching to his duties, keeps the press informed of the
Court's work. He is also responsible for publishing a collection of the
Court's judgments and advisory opinions and documents of the written proceedings and other volumes. Finally, the Registrar is responsible for the archives of the Court and prepares the Court's budget. 1
The Registrar is assisted by a staff of secretaries and other officials
who carry out a variety of functions: correspondence, legal research,
drafting and translation, interpretation at meetings of the Court, minute writing, preparation of publications, etc.

III
ACCESS TO THE COURT
Only states may be parties in cases before the Court. In the first place,
the Court is open to all the members of the United Nations, who are
ipso facto parties to the Statute of the Court.
Secondly, the Court is open to certain states which are not
members of the United Nations but which have become parties to the
Statute in accordance with Article 93, paragraph 2, of the Charter.
This Article provides that a state which is not a member may become
a party to the Statute in conditions to be determined in each case by
the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. At the request of Switzerland, the first government to ask to
1 In 1959, the expenditure of the Court was approximately US $732,000. The
estimated expenditure for 1960 is US $730,000.
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become a party to the Statute, the General Assembly adopted a resolution defining these conditions as follows: (a) acceptance of the provisions of the Statute; (b) acceptance of the obligations of a member
of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter;2 (c) an undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the Court such equitable
amount as may be fixed by the General Assembly. Switzerland became
a party to the Statute in July 1948. Identical conditions were approved
by the General Assembly in the case of Liechtenstein, San Marino and
Japan,3 which subsequently became parties to the Statute.
Thirdly, the Court is also open to states which are not parties
to its Statute, on conditions laid down by a Security Council resolution of October 15, 1946. Such states must file with the Registrar of
the Court a declaration by which they accept the Court's jurisdiction
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute
and Rules of the Court, and undertake to comply in good faith with
the decision or decisions of the Court and to accept all the obligations
of a member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter. 2
Such a declaration may be either particular or general. A particular
declaration is one accepting the Court's jurisdiction in respect of a
particular dispute or disputes whch have already arisen. A general
declaration is one accepting the jurisdiction in respect of all disputes,
or of a particular class or classes of dispute, which have already arisen
or which may arise in the future.
The Court is therefore not open to private individuals. It has
always refused to entertain the petitions and requests which have
often been addressed to it by individuals who complain that they have
suffered a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, this does not prevent private interests from being the subject of
proceedings before the Court, for it is always open to a state to take
up the complaint of one of its nationals against another state, and to
seize the Court if it is entitled to do so. But what is then involved is
a dispute between states.

2 "1.

Each Melnber of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the
decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a
party.
"2. If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon
it under a judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the
judgment,"
3Japan became a party to the Statute in 1954, more than two years before
becoming a member of the United Nations.
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IV
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
IN CONTENTIOUS CASES

One of the functions of the Court is, by delivering binding judgments,
to decide in accordance with international law all disputes which are
submitted to it by states. But the fact that the Court is open to a
state does not mean that the state is obliged to have its disputes with
other states decided by the Court. The Court's jurisdiction to try
contentious cases depends upon the consent of states, since international justice, in contrast to national justice, is still optional.
The consent of states may be expressed in many ways. First,
two states which are in disagreement regarding a certain question may
agree to refer it to the Court. In such cases, the Court is generally
seized by the notification of a special agreement concluded for that
purpose by the two states. But a state may also accept the jurisdiction
of the Court with regard to disputes which have not yet arisen: this
is an undertaking to appear before the Court if a dispute should arise.
In such cases, the Court is usually seized by a unilateral application of
one state against another, the latter being then bound to come before
the Court. There are a great number of treaties and conventions
under which states bind themselves beforehand to accept the jurisdiction of the Court: bilateral treaties relating to all disputes that may
arise between two states or to certain categories of disputes, multilateral conventions relating to one or more categories of disputes, etc.
In the same connection, states which are parties to the Statute may
give a very broad undertaking in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2: they may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question of international law; (c) the
existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. Such
declarations are sometimes accompanied by conditions, for example:
reciprocity, limited duration, nature of the dispute. The following is
a list of the 38 states which accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court (as at August 15, 1960).
Australia
Belgium
Cambodia
Canada
China

Colombia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
EI Salvador
Finland

France
Haiti
Honduras
India
Israel
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Japan
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway

Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Philippines
Portugal
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey

Union of South Africa
United Arab Republic
United Kingdom of
Great Britain
and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Uruguay

V
WORKING OF .THE COURT

The seat of the Court is at The Hague, Netherlands. A special agreement concluded between the United Nations and the Carnegie Foundation governs the terms on which the Court occupies premises in the
Peace Palace. The Court may, however, sit and discharge its duties
elsewhere should it consider it advisable to do so. The official languages of the Court are French and English, but the Court may authorize a party to use another language.
The Court is permanently in session except during judicial
vacations. It discharges its duties as a full court (a quorum of nine
judges being sufficient) but, at the request of the parties, it may also
sit as a chamber. Indeed, the Statute provides that the Court shall
elect annually five judges to form a Chamber of Summary Procedure
for the speedy dispatch of business. The Court also has the power to
constitute one or more chambers, composed of three or more judges,
for dealing with particular categories of cases-for example, labor
cases and cases relating to transit and communications-and a chamber
for dealing with a particular case submitted to the Court. The chambers provided for in the Statute have not hitherto had occasion to
function.
A judge continues to sit even if the case before the Court
directly concerns his own country. The Rules of Court, however, provide that if the President is a national of one of the parties to a case
before the Court, he will abstain from exercising his functions as President in respect of that case.
If the Court includes upon the bench a judge of the nationality of one of the parties, any other party may choose a person to sit
as judge ad hoc in the case. Similarly if the Court includes upon the
bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of the parties
may choose a judge ad hoc.
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VI
THE LAW APPLIED BY THE COURT

In accordance with Article 38 of the Statute, the Court applies: (a)
international treaties and conventions; (b) international custom; (c)
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations and,
finally (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules
of law.
Furthermore, the Court may decide a case ex aequo et bono,
that is, according to the principles of equity, if the parties agree
thereto.
V II
PROCEDURE IN CONTENTIOUS CASES

Cases may be brought before the Court either by notification to the
Registry of a "special agreement" under which the parties agree to
refer a dispute to the Court, or by an application by one of the parties founded on a clause providing for compulsory jurisdiction. These
documents have to specify the subject of the dispute and the parties.
The Registrar forthwith communicates the special agreement or application to all concerned and also to the members of the United Nations
and to any other states entitled to appear before the Court.
The various stages of the proceedings are laid down in the
Rules of Court adopted in 1946. The parties are represented by agents
and may be assisted by counsel and advocates. The proceedings consist of two parts: written and oral. The written part usually consists of
the presentation by each of the parties of two pleadings which are
filed within time-limits fixed by order of the Court. The oral part consists of the hearing by the Court, at a public sitting, of the agents,
counsel, advocates, witnesses and experts.
The duration of the written proceedings may vary, depending,
of course, on the importance and complexity of the case: the parties
sometimes request long time-limits and frequently even extensions of
the time-limits fixed. The length of the oral proceedings before the
Court also depends on the parties. The Court then holds deliberations in camera and is able to prepare its judgment, draft it in the
two official languages of the Court and deliver it, within a few weeks.
All questions are decided by a majority of judges present; in the event
of an equality of votes, the President, or the judge who acts in his
place, has a casting vote.
As in cases before national courts, the proceedings before the
Court may give rise to questions that are incidental to these proceed11

ings. For example, a party may raise a "preliminary objection"; in
other words, it puts forward certain reasons - for example, lack of
jurisdiction - for which, in its view, the Court ought to refuse to
adjudicate on the merits of the dispute. The ruing of an objection
suspends the proceedings on the merits and gives rise to separate
proceedings. In that case, the Court must first decide on the validity
of the objection, unless it decides to join the objection to the merits.
Another example of a question arising that is incidental to the proceedings is constituted by intervention. A third state may ask to
intervene in a case, if it considers that it has an interest of a legal
nature which may be affected by the decision. It is for the Court to
decide upon a request of this kind: !f the dispute between the parties
relates to the application of a treaty which has also been signed by
other states, the latter are also entitled to take part in the proceedings,
in which case the construction given by the judgment will be equally
binding on any intervening state.
A judgment of the Court must give the reasons on which it is
based. Judges who are unable to concur in the decision of the Court,
or in the reasons given in support of it, may attach to the judgment a
statement of their separate opinions.
A judgment of the Court is binding on the parties to the case.
Although states are never compelled to submit a dispute to the Court,
once they have come before the Court they are bound to comply with
its decision. In the present state of international organization, there is
nothing to guarantee the performance of an international obligation,
including the obligation to carry out a judgment of the Court. Article
94 of the Charter, however, provides that if a party fails to perform
the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment of the Court, the
other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if
it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures
to be taken to give effect to the judgment.
A judgment of the Court is final and without appeal. After the
Court has given judgment, the only procedure available to a party is
a request for an interpretation of the judgment (in the event of dispute
as to its meaning or scope) or an application for its revision if some
new fact is discovered which, when the judgment was given, was
unknown to the Court and to the party claiming revision.
Unless it is otherwise decided, each party bears its own costs.
V III
ADVISORY OPINIONS
Apart from its jurisdiction to deal with contentious cases, the Court
also has the power to give advisory opinions, that is, its views on any
legal question, at the request of the General Assembly of the United
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Nations, the Security Council, or other bodies authorized to do so. In
certain cases provision has been made by organs authorized to request
advisory opinions of the Court that such opinions should have binding
force.
The following bodies are authorized to request the Court to
give advisory opinions:
General Assembly
Economic and Social Council
Security Council
Trusteeship Council
Interim Committee of the General Assembly
Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal
Judgments
International Labor Organization (ILO)
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO)

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
International Monetary Fund
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
International Finance Corporation (!Fc)
W orId Health Organization (WHO)
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
W orId Meteorological Organization (WMO)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

(IMCO)

The rules governing the exercise of the Court's advisory functions are laid down in the Statute and Rules of Court. It should in
particular be noted that, with regard to a request for an advisory
opinion, the Court may draw up a list of states and international
organizations considered likely to be able to furnish information on
the question and may give them an opportunity to submit their views
in writing or orally, or both. Apart from the express rules applicable
in advisory proceedings, the Court is guided by the rules applicable
in contentious cases.
When the Court has gathered all the necessary information, it
deliberates in camera. The deliberations last an average of one month.
The advisory opinion of the Court is then delivered in open court.

IX

PRESENT COMPOSITION OF THE COURT
The present members of the Court are: President Helge Klaestad
(Norway); Vice-President Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan);
Judges Jules Basdevant (France), Green H. Hackworth (1Jmteg
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States of America), Bohdan Winiarski (Poland), Abdel Hamid
Badawi (United Arab Republic), Enrique C. Armand-Ugon (Uruguay), Feodor Ivanovich Kojevnikov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Lucio M. Moreno Quintana (Argentina), Roberto Cordova
(Mexico), V. K. Wellington Koo (China), Jean Spiropoulos (Greece),
Sir Percy Spender (Australia) and Ricardo J. Alfaro (Panama). One
seat is vacant through the death of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (United
Kingdom).
By elections held in November 1960, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
( United Kingdom) will serve for the unexpired term of Sir Hersch
Lauterpacht. To succeed the five judges whose terms expire Fepruary
5, 1961 (Helge Klaestad, Sir Zafrulla Khan, Green H. Hackworth,
Enrique C. Arm and-U gon and Feodor 1. Kojevnikov), the following
were elected: Philip C. Jessup (United States), Vladimir Koretsky
(USSR), Gaetano Morelli (Italy), Kotaro Tanaka (Japan) and Jose
Luis Bustamente y Rivero (Peru.)
The Registrar of the Court is Jean Garnier-Coignet.

X
CASES DEALT W IT H BY THE COURT SINCE 1946
A.

CONTENTIOUS CASES

The following disputes have been submitted to the Court since
1946:
1. 'Corfu Channel Case

This dispute, which gave rise to three judgments by the Court, arose
out of the explosions of mines by which some British warships suffered
damage while passing through the Corfu Channel in 1946, in a part
of the Albanian waters which had been previously swept. The ships
were severely damaged and members of the crew were killed. The
United Kingdom accused Albania of having laid, or allowed a third
party to lay, the mines after mine-clearance operations had been
carried out by the Allied naval authorities. Owing to the political situation at the time, the incident caused grave tension between the two
states. The case was brought before the United Nations, and, in
consequence of a recommendation by the Security Council, it was
referred to the Court. The first of three judgments (March 25, 1948)
dealt with the question of the Court's jurisdiction, which-,Albania
had challenged.
'
.
The second and most important judgment (April 9, '1949)
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related to the merits of the problem. The Court found that Albania
was responsible under international law for the explosions that had
taken place in Albanian waters and for the damage and loss of life
which had ensued. It did not accept the view that Albania had itself
laid the mines. On the other hand, it held that the mines could not
have been laid without the knowledge of the Albanian Government.
In this connection, the Court took into account certain circumstantial
evidence which established the responsibility of the territorial government. Albania, for its part, had submitted a counterclaim against the
United Kingdom. It accused the latter of having violated Albanian
sovereignty by sending warships into Albanian territorial waters and
of carrying out mine-sweeping operations in Albanian waters after the
explosions. The Court did not accept the first of these complaints. It
upheld the generally admitted principle that states are entitled, in
time of peace, to send their warships through international straits
without first obtaining the leave of the coastal state. The Court found
that this was a case of innocent passage. On the other hand, the
mine-clearance operation of November 12 and 13, 1946, having been
effected against the will of the Albanian Government, the Court found
that it constituted an inadmissible intervention in the affairs of
Albania. In spite of the default of the Albanian Government and its
dilatory attitude, the Court held that the action of the British Navy
was a violation of Albanian sovereignty.
In a third and final judgment (December 15, 1949), the Court
assessed the amount of reparation due by Albania to the United
Kingdom. This amount had been determined as a result of"an expert
enquiry and Albania was ordered to pay the United Kingdom a total
sum of .£ 844,000 for the damage caused to the" ships and as compensation for the deaths of members of the crews and for personal
injuries suffered by them.
2.

The Fisheries Case

The judgment delivered by the Court in the' Fisheries Case set a term
to a controversy which had been pending between the United Kingdom and Norway for a very long period. In 1935, N.o rway enacted a
decree by which it reserved certain fishing grounds situated off the
northern coast of Norway for the exclusive use of its own fishermen.
The question at issue was whether this decree, which laid down!' a
particular method for drawing the baselines from which the width
of the Norwegian territorial waters had to be calculated, was valid
in international law. This case, which aroused considerable interest,
esp"ecially in maritime states, gave rise to prolonged and voluminous
proceedings. In its judgment of December 18, 1951, the Court found
that, contrary to the submissions of the United Kingdom, neither the
method employed for the delimitation by the 1935 decree nor the
15

lines themselves fixed by the said decree were contrary to international law•
3.

Case concerning the Protection of French Nationals and
Protected Persons in Egypt

As a consequence of certain measures adopted by the Egyptian
Government against the property and persons of various French
nationals and protected persons in Egypt, France instituted proceedings in which it invoked the Montreux Convention of 1935, concerning
the abrogation of the capitulations in Egypt. However, the case was
not proceeded with, as the Egyptian Government desisted from the
measures in question. By agreement between the parties, the case
was struck off the Courfs List (Order of March 29, 1950).
4.

The Asylum Case

The granting of asylum in the Colombian Embassy at Lima on January
3, 1949, to a Peruvian national, Haya de la Torre, a political leader
accused of having instigated a military rebellion, was the subject of a
dispute between Peru and Colombia which the parties agreed to sub~
mit to the Court. The Pan-American Havana Convention on Asylum
(1928) laid down that, subject to certain conditions, asylum could
be granted in a foreign embassy to a political offender who was a
national of the territorial state. The question in dispute was whether
Colombia, as the state granting the asylum, was entitled u·nilaterally
to "qualify" the offence committed by the refugee in a manner binding on the territorial state - that is, to decide whether it was a political
offence or a common crime. Furthermore, the Court was asked to
decide whether the territorial state was bound to afford the necessary
guarantees to enable the refugee to leave the country in safety. In its
judgment of November 20, 1950, the Court answered both these
questions in ·t he negative, but at the same time it specified that Peru
had not proved that Haya de la Torre was a common criminal. Lastly,
it found in favor of a counterclaim submitted by Peru that Haya de la
Torre had been granted asylum in violation of the Havana Convention,
as it considered that the asylum had been irregularly granted because
Haya de la Torre had sought refuge in the Embassy some three
months after the suppression of the military rebellion, which showed
that the "urgency" prescribed by the Havana Convention as a condition for the regularity of asylum no longer existed.
On the very day on which the Court delivered this judgment,
Colombia filed a request for an interpretation. By this request,
Colombia sought to obtain from the Court a reply to the question
whether the judgment implied an obligation binding the Colombian
authorities to surrender the refugee, Haya de Ia Torre, to the Peruvian
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authorities. In a judgment delivered on November 27, 1950, the
Court declared that the questions raised by Colombia were new
questions, that they had not been presented in the preceding case,
and that therefore the Court could not decide upon them by way of
interpretation. The Court further pointed out that a request for interpretation could only be founded on a dispute between the parties
concerning the meaning of the judgment, which dispute could not
have arisen because the request for interpretation had been submitted on the same day as the delivery of the judgment. The Colombian request was therefore dismissed.
5.

Haya de la Torre Case

This case, a sequel to the earlier proceedings, was instituted by
Colombia by means of a fresh application. Immediately after the
judgment of November 20, 1950, Peru had called upon Colombia to
surrender Haya de la Torre. Colombia refused to do so, maintaining
that neither the applicable legal provisions nor the Court's judgment
placed it under an obligation to surrender the refugee to the Peruvian
authorities. The Court confirmed this view in its judgment of June 13,
1951. It declared that the question was a new one, and that although
the Havana Convention expressly prescribed the surrender of common
criminals to the local authorities, no obligation of the kind existed in
regard to political offenders. While confirming that asylum had been
irregularly granted and that on this ground Peru was entitled to demand its termination, the Court declared that Colombia was not
bound to surrender the refugee; these two conclusions, it stated, were
not contradictory because there were other ways in which the asylum
could be terminated besides the surrender of the refugee.
6.

Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States
in Morocco

By a decree of December 30, 1948, the French authorities in the
Moroccan Protectorate imposed a system of licence control in respect
of imports not involving an official allocation of currency, and limited
these imports to a number of products indispensable to the Moroccan
economy. The United States maintained that this measure affected its
rights under treaties with Morocco and contended that, in accordance
with these treaties and with the General Act of Algeciras of 1906, no
Moroccan law or regulation could be applied to its nationals in
Morocco without its previous consent. In its judgment of August 27,
1952, the Court held that the import controls were contrary to the
treaty between the United States and Morocco of 1836 and the
General Act of Algeciras, since they involved discrimination in favor
of France against the United States. The Court considered the extent
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of the consular jurisdiction of the United States in Morocco and held
that the United States was entitled to exercise such jurisdiction in the
French zone in all disputes, civil or criminal, between United States
citizens or persons protected by the United States. It was also entitled
to exercise such jurisdiction to the extent required by the relevant
provisions of the General Act of Algeciras. The Court rejected the
contention of the United States that its consular jurisdiction included
cases in which only the defendant was a citizen or protege of the
United States. It also rejected the claim by the United States that the
application to citizens of the United States of laws and regulations in
the French Zone of Morocco required the assent of the United States
Government. Such assent was required only in so far as the intervention
of the consular courts of the United States was necessary for the effective enforcement of such laws or regulations as against United States
citizens. The Court rejected a counterclaim by the United States that
its nationals in Morocco were entitled to immunity from taxation. It
also dealt with the question of the valuation of imports by the Moroccan customs authorities.
7.

Ambatielos Case

In 1919, Ambatielos, a Greek shipowner, entered into a contract for
the purchase of ships with the Government of the United Kingdom.
Ambatielos claimed he had suffered damage through the failure of the
United Kingdom Government to carry out the terms of the contract
and as a result of certain judgments given against 'him by the English
courts in circumstances which were alleged to be contrary to international law. The Greek Government took up the case of its national
and claimed that the United Kingdom was under a duty to submit
the dispute to arbitration in accordance with treaties between the
United Kingdom and Greece of 1886 and 1926. The United Kingdom
objected to the Court's jurisdiction. In a judgment of July 1, 1952, the
Court held that it had jurisdiction to decide whether the United
Kingdom was under a duty to submit the dispute to arbitration but,
on the other hand, that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the merits
of the Ambatielos claim. In a further judgment of May 19, 1953, the
Court decided that the dispute was one which the United Kingdom
was under a duty to submit to arbitration in accordance with the
treaties of 1886 and 1926.
8.

Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case

In 1933, an agreement was concluded between the Government of
Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. In 1951, laws were passed
in Iran for the nationalization of the oil industry. These laws resulted
in a dispute between Iran and the Company. The United Kingdom
took up the case of the latter and instituted proceedings before the
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Court. Iran disputed the Court's jurisdiction. In its judgment of July
22, 1952, the Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to deal with
the dispute. Its jurisdiction depended on the declarations by Iran and
the United Kingdom accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction
under the optional clause of the Statute. The Court held that the
declaration by Iran, which was ratified in 1932, covered only disputes
based on treaties concluded by Iran after that date, whereas the claim
of the United Kingdom was directly or indirectly based on treaties
concluded prior to 1932. The Court also rejected the view that the
agreement of 1933 was both a concessionary contract between Iran
and the Company and an international treaty between Iran and the
United Kingdom, since the United Kingdom was not a party to the
contract. The position was not altered by the fact that the concessionary contract was negotiated through the good offices of the
Council of the League of Nations. By an order of July 5, 1951, the
Court had indicated interim measures of protection, that is, provisional measures for protecting the rights alleged by either party, in
proceedings already instituted, until a final judgment is given. In its
judgment the Court declared that the order of July 5, 1951, had
ceased to be operative and that the provisional measures therefore
lapsed.
9.

The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case

The Minquiers and Ecrehos are hvo groups of islets situated between
the British Channel Island of Jersey and the coast of France. Under
a special agreement between France and the United Kingdom, the
Court was asked to determine which of the parties had produced a
more convincing proof of title to these groups of islets. After the
conquest of England by William, Duke of Normandy, in 1066, the
islands formed part of the Union between England and Normandy
which lasted until 1204, when Philip Augustus of France conquered
Normandy but failed to occupy the islands. The United Kingdom submitted that the islands then remained united with England and that
this situation was placed on a legal basis by subsequent treaties between the two countries. France contended that the Minquiers and
Ecrehos were held by France after 1204, and referred to the same
medieval treaties as those relied on by the United Kingdom. In its
judgment of November 17, 1953, the Court considered that none of
these treaties stated specifically which islands were held by the King
of England or by the King of France. Moreover, what was of decisive
importance was not indirect presumptions based on matters in the
Middle Ages, but direct evidence of possession and the actual exercise
of sovereignty. After considering this evidence, the Court arrived at
the conclusion that the sovereignty over the Minquiers and Ecrehos
belonged to the United Kingdom.
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10.

The Nottebohm Case

In this case Liechtenstein claimed restitution and compensation from
the Government of Guatemala on the ground that the latter had acted
toward Mr. Nottebohm, a citizen of Liechtenstein, in a manner contrary to international law. Guatemala objected to the Court's jurisdiction but the Court overruled this objection in a judgment of
November 18, 1953. In a second judgment of April 6, 1955, the
Court held that Liechtenstein's claim was inadmissible on grounds
relating to Mr. Nottebohm's nationality. It was the bond of nationality
between a state and an individual which alone conferred upon the
state the right to put forward an international claim on his behalf.
Mr. Nottebohm, who was then a German national, had settled in
Guatemala in 1905 and continued to reside there. In October 1939after the beginning of the Second World War - while on a visit to
Europe, he obtained Liechtenstein nationality and returned to Guatemala in 1940, where he resumed his former business activities until
his removal as a result of war measures in 1943. On the international
plane the grant of nationality was entitled to recognition by other
states only if it represented a genuine connection between the individual and the state granting its nationality. Mr. Nottebohm's nationality, however, was not based on any real prior connection with
Liechtenstein, since he always retained his family and business connections with Germany and had been settled in Guatemala for 34
years. Moreover, the object of his naturalization was to enable him
to acquire the status of a neutral national in time of war. For these
reasons, Liechtenstein was not entitled to take up his case and put
forward an international claim on his behalf against Guatemala.

11.

Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943

A certain quantity of monetary gold was removed by the Germans
from Rome in 1943. It was later recovered in Germany and found to
belong to Albania. The 1946 agreement on reparation from Germany
provided that monetary gold found in Germany should be pooled for
distribution among the countries entitled to receive a share of it. The
United Kingdom claimed that the gold should be delivered to it in
partial satisfaction of the Court's judgment of 1946 in the Corfu
Channel case (see No.1, page 14). Italy claimed that the gold should
be delivered to it in partial satisfaction for the damage which it
alleged it had suffered as a result of an Albanian law of January 13,
1945. In the Washington statement of April 25, 1951, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, to
whom the implementation of the reparations agreement had been entrusted, decided that the gold should be delivered to the United

22

Kingdom unless, within a certain time limit, Italy or Albania applied
to the Court requesting it to adjudicate on their respective rights.
Albania took no action in the matter, but within the prescribed time
limit Italy made an application to the Court. Later, however, Italy
raised the preliminary question as to whether the Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the validity of the Italian claim against
Albania. In its judgment of June 15, 1954, the Court decided that, in
order to determine whether Italy was entitled to receive the gold, it
was necessary to determine whether Albania had committed an international wrong against Italy and whether it was under an obligation
to pay compensation to Italy. To go into the merits of such questions
would be to decide a dispute between Italy and Albania which the
Court had no jurisdiction to do without Albania's consent. For this
reason the Court could also not decide the question of priority as
between the claims of Italy and the United Kingdom, for this question
could arise only if it was decided that, as between Italy and Albania,
the gold should go to Italy.

12.

Electricite de Beyrouth Company Case

This case between France and Lebanon arose out of certain measures
adopted by the Lebanese Government which the Electricite de Beyrouth Company, a French limited company, regarded as contrary to
undertakings entered into by that Government. These undertakings,
which related to concessions of French companies and companies with
French capital in Lebanon, formed part of an agreement between
France and Lebanon of 1948. Mter the case had been brought before
the Court by France on August 11, 1953, the Lebanese Government
and the Electricite de Beyrouth Company entered into an agreement
on March 26, 1954, for the settlement of the dispute by a repurchase
of the concession. This agreement was ratified by the Lebanese Parliament on June 30, 1954. Moreover, it was agreed between the French
and Lebanese Governments that as soon as a settlement was reached,
France would discontinue the proceedings. On July 23, 1954, therefore, the French Government informed the Court that it was not
going on with the proceedings, and on July 29, 1954, the Court
made an order for the removal of the case from the List.

13-14.

Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of
United States of America

On March 3, 1954, the United States of America instituted proceedings against the Hungarian People's Republic and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics "on account of certain actions of the Hungarian
23

Government in concert with the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics" regarding an aircraft and crew of the United
States which had been forced to land on Hungarian territory. The
United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's Statute,
which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases
which the parties refer to it, and it stated that it submitted to the
Court's jurisdiction for the purpose of the two cases and indicated
that it was open to the other two governments to do likewise. In a
letter to the Court dated April 30, 1954, the Government of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics attributed responsibility for the incident
to the United States and said that it regarded as unacceptable the
proposal of the Government of the United States that the Court
should examine the case. In a letter to the Court dated June 14, 1954,
the Hungarian Government stated that it was unable to submit to its
jurisdiction in the matter. The Court found that in the circumstances
it did not have jurisdiction to deal with these cases and on July 12,
1954, it made two orders removing them from the List.
15.

Aerial Incident of March 10, 195-3

On March 29, 1955, the United States instituted proceedings against
Czechoslovakia on account of "certain wrongful acts committed by
MIG-type aircraft from Czechoslovakia within the United States zone
of occupation in Germany on March la, 1953." In its application to
the Court, the United States Government stated that it submitted to
the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the case and that it was
open to the Czechoslovak Government to do likewise. The United
States Government relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's
Statute, which provides that the Court's jurisdiction comprises all
cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to the Court, Czechoslovakia attributed responsibility for the incident to the United States
and considered that there was no reason for the case to be dealt with
by the Court. The Court found that Czechoslovakia had not accepted
its jurisdiction to deal with the dispute and on March 14, 1956, it
made an order ren10ving the case from the List.
16- 17.

Antarctica Cases

On May 4, 1955, the United Kingdom instituted proceedings before
the Court against Argentina and Chile concerning disputes as to the
sovereignty over certain lands and islands in the Antarctic. In its
applications to the Court, the United Kingdom stated that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the case, and
although, as far as it was aware, Argentina and Chile had not yet
accepted the Court's jurisdiction, they were legally qualified to do so.
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Moreover, the United Kingdom relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of
the Court's Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court
comprises all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter of July 15,
1955, the Government of Chile informed the Court that in its view
the application of the Government of the United Kingdom was unfounded and that it was not open to the Court to exercise jurisdiction.
In a note of August 1, 1955, the Government of Argentina informed
the Court of its refusal to accept its jurisdiction to deal with the case.
In these circumstances, the Court found that neither Chile nor Argentina had accepted its jurisdiction to deal with the cases and on
March 16, 1955, it made orders removing them from the List.
18.

Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952

On June 2, 1955, the United States instituted proceedings against the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of Hcertain wilful acts
committed by fighter aircraft of the Soviet Government against a
United States Air Force B29 aircraft and its crew off Hokkaido, Japan,
on October 7, 1952." In its application to the Court, the United
States Government stated that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction
for the purposes of the case and that it was open to the Soviet Government to do likewise. The United States relied on Article 36, paragraph
1, of the Court's Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the
Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to
the Court, the Soviet Union attributed responsibility for the incident
to the United States and considered that there was no reason for the
question to be dealt with by the Court. The Court found that the
Soviet Union had not accepted its jurisdiction to deal with the dispute
and on March 14, 1956, it made an order removing the case from the
List.
19.

Case of Certain Norwegian loans

Certain Norwegian loans had been floated in France between the
years 1885 and 1909. The bonds of these loans stated the amount of
the obligation in gold or in currency convertible into gold, as well as
in various national currencies. From the time when Norway suspended the convertibility of its currency into gold, the loans had been
serviced in Norwegian kroner. The French Government, espousing
the 'cause of the French bondholders, filed an application requesting
the Court to declare that the debt should be discharged by payment
of the gold value of the coupons of the bonds on the date of payment
and of the gold value of the redeemed bonds on the date of repayment. The Norwegian Government raised a number of preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and, in the judgment it
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delivered on July 6, 1957, the Court found that it was without jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute. Indeed, the Court held that,
since its jurisdiction depended upon the two unilateral declarations
made by the parties, jurisdiction was conferred upon the Court only
to the extent to which those declarations coincided in conferring it.
The Norwegian Government was therefore entitled, by virtue of the
condition of reciprocity, to invoke in its own favor the reservation
contained in the French declaration which excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court differences relating to matters which were essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the Government of the French Republic.

20.

Case concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory

This dispute, which gave rise to two judgments by the Court, arose
out of the following set of facts. The Portuguese possessions in India
included, at some distance inland from the port of Daman, the two
enclaves of Dadra and Nagar-Aveli which, in mid-1954, passed
under an autonomous local administration. Portugal claimed that it
had a right of passage to those enclaves and between one enclave and
the other to the extent necessary for the exercise of its sovereignty
and subject to the regulation and control of India; that that right
derived from agreements concluded in the eighteenth century between Portugal and the Marathas, from local customs established between Portugal and the successive sovereigns of the Indian peninsula,
from general international custom in regard to enclaves and from the
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; that, in July
1954, contrary to the practice previously followed, the Indian Government had prevented Portugal from exercising the right of passage
claimed by it and that that situation should be redressed. The first judgment - that of November 26, 1957 - related to the jurisdiction of the
Court, which was challenged by India. The Court rejected four of the
preliminary objections raised by India and joined the other two to the
merits. In the second judgment - that of April 12, 1960 - after rejecting the two remaining preliminary objections, the Court gave its
decision on the claims of Portugal, which India maintained to be
unfounded. Mter examining the situation of Dadra and N agar-Aveli
during the Maratha period and the practice subsequently developed in
regard to those enclaves, the Court found that Portugal had in 1954
the right of passage claimed by it but that such right was limited to
the passage of private persons, civil officials and goods in general and
did not extend to armed forces, armed police, arms and ammunition.
The Court found finally that India had not acted contrary to the
obligations imposed on it by the existence of the right of passage"thus
found to belong to Portugal.
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21.

Case concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902
Governing the Guardianship of Infants

The Swedish authorities had placed an infant of Netherlands nationality residing in Sweden under the regime of protective upbringing
instituted by Swedish law for the protection of children and young
persons. The father of the child, jointly with the deputy-guardian
appointed by a Netherlands court, appealed against the action of the
Swedish authorities, but the measure of protective upbringing was
maintained. The Netherlands Government claimed that the decisions
which instituted and maintained the protective upbringing were not
in conformity with Sweden's obligations under the Hague Convention
of 1902 governing the guardianship of infants, the provisions of which
were based on the principle that the national law of the infant is
applicable. In its judgment of November 28, 1958, the Court held
that the 1902 Convention on guardianship did not include within its
scope the matter of the protection of children as understood by the
Swedish law on the protection of children and young persons and
that the 1902 Convention could not have given rise to obligations in
a field outside the matter with which it was concerned. Accordingly
the Court did not, in this case, find any failure to observe the Convention on the part of Sweden.

22.

Interhandel Case

In 1942, the Government of the United States of America vested
almost all of the shares of the General Aniline and Film Corporation
(GAF), a company 'incorporated in the United States, on the ground
that those shares, which were owned by Interhandel, a company
registered in Bale, belonged in reality to the I. G. Farbenindustrie of
Frankfurt, or that the GAF was in one way or another controlled by
that company. In an application dated October 1, 1957, the Swiss
Government asked the Court to declare that the United States Government was under an obligation to restore to Interhandel the assets
of that company which had been vested or, alternatively, that the
dispute on the matter between Switzerland and the United States
was one that was fit for submission for judicial settlement, arbitration
or conciliation. Two days later, the Swiss Government asked the Court
to indicate, as an interim measure of protection, that the United
States should not part with these assets so long as proceedings in this
dispute were pending and, in particular, should not sell the shares of
the General Aniline and Film Corporation which were claimed by the
Swiss Federal Government as the property of its nationals. On October 24, 1957, the Court made an order in which it noted that, in the
light of the information furnished to the Court, it appeared that the
sale of the shares in question could only be effected after the termina27

tion of judicial proceedings pending in the United States, in respect of
which there was no indication of a speedy conclusion; that it was the
stated intention of the United States Government not to take action
at that time to fix a time schedule for the sale of the shares and that
accordingly there was no need to indicate interim measures of protection. The United States raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and, in its judgment of March 21, 1959, the
Court found that the application of the Government of the Swiss
Confederation was inadmissible in regard both to the principal claim
and to the alternative claim for the reason that Interhandel had not
exhausted the local remedies available to it in the United States courts.

23.

Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 ( Israel v. Bulgaria)

This case arose out of the destruction by Bulgarian anti-aircraft
defence forces of an aircraft belonging to an Israel airline. Israel
instituted proceedings before the Court by means of an application in
October 1957. Bulgaria having challenged the Court's jurisdiction
to deal with the claim, Israel contended that, since Bulgaria had in
1921 accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice for an unlimited period, that acceptance became
applicable, when Bulgaria was admitted to the United Nations in
1955, to the jurisdiction of the present Court by virtue of Article 36,
paragraph 5, of the Statute, which provides that declarations made
under the Statute of the former Court, which are still in force, shall
be deemed, as between the parties to the Statute, to be acceptances
applicable to the new Court for the period which they still have to
run and in accordance with their terms. In its judgment on the preliminary objections, delivered on May 26, 1959, the Court found that it
was without jurisdiction on the ground that Article 36, paragraph 5,
was intended to preserve only declarations in force as between states
signatories of the Charter, and not subsequently to revive undertakings
which had lapsed on the dissolution of the Permanent Court.

24.

Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955
( United States of America v. Bulgaria)

This case arose out of the incident which was the subject of the proceedings mentioned under No. 23. The aircraft destroyed by Bulgarian
anti-aircraft defence forces on July 27, 1955, was carrying several
United States nationals who, like the other passengers and the members of the crew, were killed. In its application instituting proceedings,
the United States Government asked the Court to find that the
Bulgarian Goverment was liable for the damage caused through the
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deaths of the United States nationals and the destruction of their
property on board the aircraft and to a ward damages and costs ..
Bulgaria filed preliminary objections to the Court's jurisdiction and
the proceedings on the merits were therefore suspended. Before the
date fixed for the hearings of the Bulgarian objections the United
States Government informed the Court that, as a result of further
considerations of questions of jurisdiction raised by the statement of
Bulgaria's preliminary objections and the United States observations
thereon, it had decided to request the discontinuance of the proceedings. The Bulgarian Government did not oppose such discontinuance and, in an order made on May 30, 1960, the Court directed
that the case should be removed from the List.
25.

Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 ( United Kingdom v. Bulgaria)

This case arose out of the same incident as that mentioned under
Nos. 23 and 24. The aircraft destroyed by Bulgarian anti-aircraft
defence forces on July 27, 1955, was carrying several nationals of
the United Kingdom and Colonies who, like the other passengers
and the members of the crew, were killed. The United Kingdom Government asked the Court to declare that Bulgaria was responsible
for the losses sustained by citizens of the United Kingdom and
Colonies by reason of the deaths of persons on board, as well as for
the loss of personal effects and freight owned by citizens of the
United Kingdom and Colonies carried on the aircraft and to award
damages and costs against Bulgaria. The United Kingdom filed its
Memorial within the time limit fixed but, before the date fixed for
the filing of the Bulgarian Counter-Memorial, the United Kingdom
Government informed the Court of its decision to discontinue the
proceedings, having regard to the decision of the Court of May 26,
1959, that it had no jurisdiction in respect of the case concerning
this incident brought by Israel against Bulgaria. Bulgaria did not
oppose the discontinuance of the proceedings and, on August 3, 1959,
the Court made an order removing the case from the List.
26.

Case concerning Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land

By a special agreement signed in March 1957 between the Netherlands and Belgium, the Court was asked to settle a dispute as to the
sovereignty over two plots of land situated in an area north of the
Belgian town of Turnhout where the frontier between the two countries presents certain unusual features, there being a number of
enclaves formed by the Belgian commune of Baerle-Duc and the
Netherlands commune of Baarle-Nassau. The Court was informed
that this situation was of very ancient origin. From the documents
produced by the parties it appeared that a Communal Minute drawn
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up by the authorities of these two communes between 1836 and 1841
(on which the Netherlands relied) attributed the two plots in question
to Baarle-Nassau, whereas the Descriptive Minute of the frontier
annexed to the Boundary Convention of 1843 which was concluded
after the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands (and on which
Belgium relied) attributed them to Baerle-Duc, as did also the special
map annexed to the Boundary Convention. The Netherlands Government maintained that the Boundary Convention recognized the existence of the status quo as determined by the Communal Minute,
under which sovereignty over the disputed plots was recognized as
vested in the Netherlands, and that the provision by which the two
plots were attributed to Belgium was vitiated by a mistake as was
evident from a mere comparison of the terms of the Communal
Minute with those of the Descriptive Minute. The Netherlands
claimed further that its sovereignty over the disputed plots had been
established by the exercise of various acts of sovereignty since 1843.
Mter considering all the evidence produced, the Court concluded
that the Boundary Convention did determine to which state the
various plots in each commune belonged and that no case of mistake
had been made out and, finally, that the acts relied upon by the
Netherlands as establishing its sovereignty were largely of a routine
and administrative character and were insufficient to displace Belgian
sovereignty established by the Boundary Convention. In its judgment
delivered on June 20, 1959, the Court accordingly found that sovereignty over the two disputed plots belonged to Belgium.

27.

Case concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain
on December 23, 1906

On October 7, 1894, Honduras and Nicaragua signed a convention
for the demarcation of the limits between the two countries, one of
the articles of which provided that, in certain circumstances, any
points of the boundary line which were left unsettled should be
submitted to the decision of the Government of Spain. In October
1904 the King of Spain was asked to determine that part of the
frontier line on which the Mixed Boundary Commission appointed
by the two countries had been unable to reach agreement. The King
gave his arbitral award on December 23, 1906. Nicaragua contested
the validity of the award and, in accordance with a resolution of the
Organization of American States, the two countries agreed in July
1957 on the procedure to be followed for submitting the dispute on
this matter to the International Court of Justice. In the application
by which the case was brought before the Court on July 1, 1958,
the Government of Honduras claimed that failure by the Government
of Nicaragua to give effect to the arbitral award constituted a breach
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of an international obligation and asked the Court to declare that
Nicaragua was under an obligation to give eHect to the. award. The
Court was expected to render its judgment in November 1960.
28.

Aerial Incident of September 4, 1954

On August 22, 1958, the United States of America instituted proceedings against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account
of "certain willful acts committed by military aircraft of the Soviet
Government on September 4, 1954, in the international air space
over the Sea of Japan against a United States Navy P2-V-type aircraft, commonly known as a Neptune type, and against its crew."
In its application to the Court, the United States Government stated
that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the
case and that the Soviet Government was qualified to do likewise.
The United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's
Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprises
all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to the Court, the
Soviet Union attributed responsibility for the incident to the United
States and said it considered that in this case there were no questions
which needed to be considered by the Court and that it saw no basis
for turning this question over for examination by the Court. In the
circumstances, the Court found that it had not before it any acceptance by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the dispute and that
therefore it could take no further steps upon the application. The
Court accordingly made an order on December 9, 1958, removing
the case from the List.
29.

Case concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and
Power Company, Limited

On September 23, 1958, the Belgian Government filed an application
instituting proceedings against Spain in connection with the adjudication in bankruptcy in Spain in 1948 of the Barcelona Traction,
Light and Power Company, Limited, a joint-stock company formed
in Toronto in 1911. The application stated that the share capital of
this company had, for more than 25 years, belonged largely to Belgian
nationals. The Belgian Government claimed that the measures, acts,
decisions and omissions of the organs of the Spanish state by virtue
of which the company was declared bankrupt and its property liquidated were contrary to international law and that the Spanish state
was responsible for the damage that resulted therefrom and was
consequently under an obligation to restore the property, rights and
interests of the company as they existed prior to its adjudication in
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bankruptcy or, if suoh restitution is wholly or partly impossible, to
pay to the Belgian state equivalent compensation. As an alternative,
the Court was asked to declare that compensation must be paid up
to the amount of the share of the capital owned by Belgian nationals
together with the amount of the sums standing due to them at the
date of the adjudication in bankruptcy. In May 1960 the Spanish
Government filed preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the
Court and the proceedings on the merits were suspended. The Court
has not yet rendered judgment on the objections raised by Spain.
30.

Case concerning the Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des
Entrepots de Beyrouth and the Societe Radio-Orient

This case between France and Lebanon arose out of certain measures
adopted by the Lebanese Government with regard to two French
limited companies, the Compagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entrepots de Beyrouth and the Societe Radio-Orient. The French Government considered these measures to be contrary to certain undertakings
embodied in an agreement concluded between France and Lebanon
in 1948 relating to concessions of French companies and companies
with French capital in Lebanon. France instituted proceedings against
Lebanon by means of an application on February 13, 1959. Lebanon
raised preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court but,
before a date had been fixed for the hearings on the preliminary objections, the Court was informed by the parties that satisfactory
arrangements had been concluded, the situation of the Compagnie
du Port, des Quais et des Entrepots de Beyrouth having been settled
for the future by a convention of April 13, 1960, between the state
of Lebanon and the company, together with an exchange of letters
between the President of the Council of Ministers of Lebanon and
the Ambassador of the French Republic at Beirut, and the Societe
Radio-Orient having been fully satisfied by a decision of the Council
of Ministers of Lebanon dated May 11, 1960. The President of the
Court accordingly made an order on August 31, 1960, removing the
case from the List.
31.

Aerial Incident of November 7, 1954

On July 7, 1959, the United States of America instituted proceedings
against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on account of the
destruction on November 7, 1954, of a United States Air Force B-29
aircraft in the Japanese territorial air space over Hokkaido, Japan.
In its application to the Court, the United States Government stated
that it submitted to the Court's jurisdiction for the purposes of the
case and that the Soviet Government was qualified to do likewise.
The United States relied on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Court's
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Statute, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Court comprifies
all cases which the parties refer to it. In a letter to the Court, the
Soviet Union attributed responsibility for the incident to the United
States and said it considered that in this case there were no questions
which needed to be solved by the Court and that it did not see any
basis for the filing of this case with the Court. In these circumstances,
the Court found that it had not before it any acceptance by the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the dispute and that therefore it
could take no further steps upon the application. The Court accordingly made an order on October 7, 1959, removing the case from the
List.
32.

Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear

In an application instituting proceedings against Thailand filed on
October 6, 1959, Cambodia complained that since 1949 Thailand had
persisted in the occupation of a portion of Cambodian territory where
there are the ruins of a holy monastery, the Temple of Preah Vihear,
a sacred place of pilgrimage and worship for the people of Cambodia.
Cambodia asked the Court to declare that territorial sovereignty
over the Temple belonged to the Kingdom of Cambodia and that
Thailand was under an obligation to withdraw the detachments of
armed forces it had stationed since 1954 in the ruins of the Temple.
On May 23, 1960, the Government of Thailand filed preliminary
objections to the jurisdiction of the Court and the proceedings on the
merits were suspended. The Court has not yet rendered judgment
on the objections raised by Thailand.

B.

ince 1946, th
opinions:
1.

ADVISORY OPINIONS

Court has given the follo\ving advisory

Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the
United Nations ( Article 4 of the Charter)

Since the creation of the United Nations some 12 states had unsuccessfully applied for admission. Their applications were rejected by
the Security Council in consequence of a veto imposed by one or
other of the states which are permanent members of the Council.
A proposal was then made for the admission of all the candidates at
the same time. The General Assembly referred the question to the
Court. In the interpretation it gave of Article 4 of the Charter, in
its advisory opinion of May 28, 1948, the Court declared that the
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conditions laid down for the admission of states were exhaustive and
that if these conditions were fulfilled by a state which was a candidate, the Security Council ought to make the recommendation which
would enable the General Assembly to decide upon the admission.
2.

Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a
State to the United Nations

The preceding opinion given by the Court did not lead to a settlement of the problem in the Security Council. A member of the United
Nations then proposed that the word "recommendation" in Article 4
of the Charter should be construed as not necessarily signifying a
favorable recommendation. In other words, a state might be admitted
by the General Assembly even in the absence of a recommendation,
this being interpreted as an unfavorable recommendation. This would,
it was suggested, make it possible to escape the effects of the veto.
In the advisory opinion which the Court delivered on this subject on
March 3, 1950, it pointed out that the Charter laid down two conditions for the admission of new members: a "recommendation" by
the Security Council and a "decision" by the General Assembly. If
the latter body had power to decide without a recommendation by
the Security Council, the Council would be deprived of an important
function assigned to it by the Charter. The absence of a recommendation by the Security Council, as the result of a veto, could not be
interpreted as an "unfavorable" recommendation, since the Council
itself had interpreted its own decision as meaning that no recommendation had been made.
3.

Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations

As a consequence of the assassination in Palestine of Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Palestine Mediator, and other members of
the United Nations Mission to Palestine, the General Assembly asked
the Court whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an
international claim against the state responsible with a view to obtaining reparation for damage caused to the Organization and to the
victim. If this question were answered in the affirmative, it was further
asked in what manner the action taken by the United Nations could
be reconciled with such rights as might be possessed by the state of
which the victim was a national. In its opinion of April 11, 1949,
the Court held that the Organization was intended to exercise functions and rights which could only be explained on the basis of the
possession of a large measure of international personality and the
capacity to operate upon the international plane. It followed that the
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Organization had the capacity to bring a claim and to give it the
character of an international action for reparation for the damage that
had been caused to it. The Court further declared that the Organization can claim reparation not only in respect of damage caused to
itself, but also in respect of damage suffered by the victim or persons
entitled through him. Although, according to the traditional rule,
diplomatic protection had to be exercised by the national state, the
Organization should be regarded in international law as possessing
the powers which, even if they are not expressly essential in the
Charter, are conferred upon the Organization as being essential to
the discharge of its functions. The Organization may require to
entrust its agents with important missions in disturbed parts of the
world. In such cases, it is necessary that the agents should receive
suitable support and protection. The Court therefore found that the
Organization has the capacity to claim appropriate reparation, including also reparation for damage suffered by the victim or by persons
entitled through him. The risk of possible competition between the
Organization and the victim's national state could be eliminated
either by means of a general convention or by a particular agreement
in any individual case.

4-5.

Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary
and Romania

This case concerned the procedure to be adopted in regard to the
settlement of disputes between the states signatories of the peace
treaties of 1947 (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, on the one hand, and
the Allied states, on the other). In the first opinion (March 30, 1950),
the Court stated that the countries which had signed a treaty providing an arbitral procedure for the settlement of disputes relating
to the interpretation or application of the treaty were under an
obligation to appoint their representatives to the arbitration commissions prescribed by the treaty.
Notwithstanding the opinion given on March 30, 1950, the
three states, which had declined to appoint their representatives on
the arbitration commissions, failed to modify their attitude. A time
limit was given to them within which to comply with the obligation
laid down in the treaties as they had been interpreted by the Court.
After the expiry of the time limit, the Court was requested to say
whether the Secretary-General, who, by the terms of the treaties,
was authorized to appoint the third member of the arbitration commission in the absence of agreement between the parties in respect
of this appointment, could proceed to make this appointment, even
if one of the parties had failed to appoint its representative. In a
further advisory opinion of July 18, 1950, the Court replied that
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this method couId not be adopted since it would result in creating a
commission of two members, whereas the Treaty provided for a commission of three members, reaching its decisions by a majority.
6.

International Status of South West Africa

This advisory opinion, given on July 11, 1950, at the request of the
General Assembly, was concerned with the determination of the legal
status of the territory, the administration of which had been placed by
the League of Nations after the First World War under the mandate
of the Union of South Africa. The League had disappeared, and with
it the machinery for the supervision of the mandates. Moreover, the
Charter of the United Nations did not provide that the former mandated territories should automatically come under trusteeship. The
Court held that the dissolution of the League of Nations and its
supervisory machinery had not entailed the lapse of the mandate,
and that the mandatory power was still under an obligation to give
an account of its administration to the United Nations, which was
legally qualified to discharge the supervisory functions formerly exercised by the League of Nations. The degree of supervision to be
exercised by the General Assembly should not, however, exceed that
which applied under the mandates system and should conform as
far as possible to the procedure followed in this respect by the Council
of the League of Nations. On the other hand, the mandatory power
was not under an obligation to place the territory under trusteeship,
although jt might have certain political and moral duties in this
connection. Finally, it had no competence to modify the international
status of South West Africa unilaterally.
7.

Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions
concerning the Territory of South West Africa

In the preceding advisory opinion, the Court considered that South
West Africa had the status of a territory under international mandate
and that the supervisory functions of the League of Nations were to
be exercised by the United Nations. The degree of sUQh supervision
was not to exceed that which applied under the mandates system.
On October 11, 1954, the General Assembly adopted a special Rule F
on voting procedure to be followed by the General Assembly in
taking decisions on questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the territory of South West Mrica. According to this rule,
such decisions were to be regarded as important questions within
the meaning of Article 18, paragraph 2, of the United Nations
Charter and would therefore require a two-thirds majority of members
of the United Nations present and voting. In its advisory opinion of
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June 7, 1955, the Court considered that Rule F was a correct application of its earlier advisory opinion. It related only to procedure,
and procedural matters were not material to the degree of supervision
exercised by the General Assembly. Rule F could not therefore be
considered as instituting a greater degree of supervision than applied
under the mandates system. Moreover, the General Assembly was
entitled to apply its own voting procedure and Rule F was in accord
with the requirement that the supervision exercised by the General
Assembly should conform as far as possible to the procedure followed
by the Council of the League of Nations.
8.

Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on
South West Africa

In this advisory opinion, of June 1, 1956, the Court considered that
it would be in accordance with its advisory opinion of 1950 on the
international status of South West Africa (see No. 6 above) for the
Committee on South West Africa, established by the General Assembly, to grant oral hearings to petitioners on matters relating to the
Territory of South West Africa if such a course was necessary for
the maintenance of effective international supervision of the mandated
territory. The General Assembly, which now carried out the supervisory functions formerly exercised by the Council of the League of
Nations, was legally qualified to carry out an effective and adequate
supervision of the administration of the mandated territory. Under
the League of Nations, the relevant legal provisions made no reference to hearings and no hearings were ever in fact granted. The
League Council would, however, have been competent to authorize
such hearings. Although the degree of supervision to be exercised
by the General Assembly should not exceed that which applied under
the mandates system, the grant of hearings would not involve such
an excess in the degree of supervision. Under the existing circumstances, the hearing of petitioners by the Committee on South West
Africa might be in the interest of the proper working of the mandates
system.
9.

Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide

In November 1950, the General Assembly asked the Court a series
of questions as to the position of a state which attached reservations
to its signature of the multilateral Convention on Genocide if other
states, signatories of the same convention, objected to these
reserva tions.
The Court considered, in its opinion of May 18, 1951, that,
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even if a convention contained no article on the subject of reservations, it did not follow that they were prohibited. The character of
the convention, its purpose and its provisions must be taken into
account. It was the compatibility of the reservation with the purpose
of the convention which must furnish the criterion of the attitude
of the state making the reservation, and of the state which objected
thereto. The Court did not consider that it was possible to give an
absolute answer to the abstract question put to it.
As regards the effects of the reservation in relations between
states, the Court considered that a state could not be bound by a
reservation to which it had not consented. Every state was therefore
free to decide for itself whether the state which formula ted the
reservation was or was not a party to the convention. The situation
presented real disadvantages, but they could only be remedied by
the insertion in the convention of an article on the use of reservations.
A third question referred to the effects of an objection by a
state which was not yet a party to the convention, either because it
had not signed it or because it had signed but not ratified it. The
Court was of the opinion that, as regards the first case, it would be
inconceivable that a state which had not signed the convention
should be able to exclude another state from it. In the second case,
the situation was different; the objection was valid, but it would not
produce an immediate legal effect; it would merely express and proclaim the attitude which a signatory state would assume when it had
become a party to the convention. In all the foregoing the Court
adjudicated only on the specific case referred to it, namely, the
Genocide Convention.

10.

Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal was established by the
General Assembly to hear applications alleging non-observance of
contracts of employment of staff members of the Secretariat of the
United Nations or of the terms of appointment of such staff members.
In its advisory opinion of July 13, 1954, the Court considered that
the General Assembly of the United Nations was not entitled on any
grounds to refuse to give effect to an award of compensation made
by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal in favor of a staff
member of the United Nations whose contract of service had been
terminated without his assent. The Tribunal was an independent
and truly judicial body pronouncing final judgments without appeal
within the limited field of its functions and not merely an advisory or
subordinate organ. Its judgments were therefore binding on the
United Nations Organization and thus also on the General Assembly.
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11.

Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International
Labor Organization upon Complaints Made against the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

The Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of ILO (the jurisdiction
of which had been accepted by UNESCO for the purpose of settling
certain disputes which might arise between the organization and its
staff members) provided that the Tribunal's judgments should be
final and without appeal, subject to the right of the organization to
challenge them on the ground, inter alia, that a decision of the
Tribunal conBrming its jurisdiction was wTong. It further provided
that in the event of such a challenge, the question of the valadity of
the decision should be refeTred to the Court for an advisory opinion,
vvhich would be binding.
UNESCO alleged that foul' judgments given by the Tribunal in
favoT of staff members were invalid on the ground that the Tribunal
had wrongly decided the question of its own jurisdiction. The organization contended that the staff members, who had held fixed-teTm
appointments and who had complained of the Director-General's
refusal to renew their contracts on expiry, had no legal right to such
renewal, and that consequently the Tribunal had no jurisdiction,
since it was competent only to hear complaints alleging non-observance of the terms of appointment of officials and of provisions of the
Staff Regulations. It accordingly requested an advisory opinion of
the Court.
The Court was of the opinion that an administrative memorandum, which had announced that all holders of fixed-term contracts
would, subject to certain conditions, be offered renewals, might
reasonably be regarded as binding on the organization and that it
was sufficient, to establish the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, that the
complaints should appear to have a substantial and not merely
artificial connection with the terms and provisions invoked. The
Court was not concerned with the decisions of the Tribunal on the
merits. On the issue of jurisdiction, it expressed the opinion that the
Administrative Tribunal had been competent to hear the complaints
in question.
12.

Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization

The Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization comprises, among other organs, an Assembly and a Maritime Safety Committee. Under the terms of article 28(a) of the convention for the
establishment of the organization, this Committee consists of fourteen
members elected by the Assembly from the members of the organi-
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zation having an important interest in maritime safety, "of which not
less than eight shall be the largest ship-owning nations." When, on
January 15, 1959, the Assembly, for the first time, proceeded to elect
the members of the Committee, it elected neither Liberia nor Panama:
although those two states were among the eight members of the
Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization which possessed the largest registered tonnage. Subsequently, the Assembly
decided to ask the Court whether the Maritime Safety Committee was
constituted in accordance with the convention for the establishment
of the organization. In its advisory opinion of June 8, 1960, the Court
replied to this question in the negative.
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